

## Re-conceptualizing Environmental Ethics in the Anthropocene

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### ABSTRACT

This essay critically analyzes two partakers of environmental ethics: environment and human, to understand how these are conceptualized in the discipline. I argue this critical evaluation is particularly necessary to comprehend why after more than four decades since environmental ethics has emerged, we arrive at the zenith of the Anthropocene. I see this analysis would precisely demarcate the ground, environmental ethics needs to cover to become appropriate for the era of the Anthropocene. This essay affirms that it is high time to delve into the relationship between human and the environment to understand the relational conceptualization of environment for adopting a hybridized notion to meet the needs of the hour. This concludes that adopting phenomenology as a theoretical perspective as well as a methodological tool could enable environmental ethics to uphold a relational conceptualization of environment—appropriate for the Anthropocene.

*Keywords:* Anthropocene, environmental ethics, human—environment relationship, phenomenology

### INTRODUCTION

It has been almost half a century, since environmental movements have emerged and went through various phases in different parts of the world. Since then, environmental concerns gained prominence in the society as a whole, and these concerns have even become an integral part of the developmental discourse. As an upshot of the fact that these concerns are predominantly anthropocentric, it is more than 4 decades since environmental ethics as a discipline has emerged to guide human society to ethically addressing the issues relating to the environment and for extending

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the purview of moral consideration to other living and non-living beings. Even though, environmental ethics is a well-developed discipline to guide the human—environment relationship for overcoming multifaceted environmental problems, we enter the era of the Anthropocene—an era when anthropogenic impacts are equated to being one of the prime geological forces. At the same time, we see environmental problems are mounting day-by-day and the threat of climate change is looming large on every nook and corner of the global society. In this context, I posit, it is the high time when the underlying assumptions and presuppositions beneath the discipline of environmental ethics gets critically analyzed to possibly shed light on whether this discipline is equipped enough to face the Anthropocene.

In this essay, I primarily attempt to see how environmental ethics conceptualizes its two partakers: environment and human. I see this analysis would precisely demarcate the ground environmental ethics needs to cover to become appropriate for the era of the Anthropocene, where the urgency to work on environmental issue does not remain limited to moral debates, rather it becomes the question of the very survival of life on Earth, including ourselves.

### **Notion of Environment in Environmental Ethics**

The genesis of environmental ethics points towards the historical shifts in our conception of 'nature'. Modifications in the epistemological as well as in the ontological

understanding of nature, particularly have induced these shifts. 'Nature' as a concept possesses multiple layers of understanding as Soper (1995) and Baidur (2015) teased out. Soper (1995) precisely pointed out that there were three kinds of conception of nature. The first one is based on a metaphysical grounding through which we divided human and nonhuman in the first place. The realist conception which in a way rest on the scientific understanding of nature is the second one. The third one is the lay and surface conception where nature is just an ordinary observable feature. The concept of nature has gone through various stages starting from its romantic notion, to the cosmological understanding of nature, and now to the post-enlightenment articulation of it. Frank (1997) denoted that nature as a concept was being reformulated in the course of the last hundred years. By analyzing the trend in various international treaties, Frank substantiated that the shift in the conception of nature from a storehouse of resources to the universal life sustaining 'environment', actually provided the necessary awareness and subsequently, invoked moral obligation to care for it. This shift in the conception of nature in the form of environment can be considered as being the primary foundation of the discipline of environmental ethics. Without this shift from nature to environment, it would be next to impossible to engage in any sort of ethical discussion concerning 'nature'. To capture this same difficulty, Vogel (2002) stated 'there is nothing ethical

in nature', rather, 'nature is always already ethically interpreted' (ibid., 34). At the outset, I would like to clarify that though the notion of environment can be seen as a post-enlightenment articulation of nature stemming out of the scientific worldview, I see however, the concept of environment is broadened over time to uphold multiple conceptualizations. In the rest of this essay, I will use the term nature and environment somewhat synonymously to capture different contours of this discourse.

In the following, from the existing literature my attempt will be to comprehend how traditional schools of environmental ethics conceptualize the environment. Here, I will also discuss an entirely different way of comprehending the environment advocated by the social constructivist school.

### **Conception of Environment in the Environmental Ethics**

Over time, transformations in the conceptualization of nature as the environment clearly indicates the influence of scientific epistemology on environmental ethics as it predominantly borrows the conception of environment from ecological science. Ecology as a discipline studies the relationship between living things and environment and conceptualizes environment as an integrated whole (Marshall, 1992). The scientific paradigm of ecology emerges along with the advent of Darwin's theory of evolution. Darwin's descriptive project of natural history offers completely a new way of understanding

nature and other life forms. Rozzi (1999) pointed out that the 'tree of life' and 'the web of life' were the two very different ways of portraying the natural history. Baindur (2015) underlined the implication of this natural history on environmental ethics. Through the image of a tree, Darwin offers an ethical justification to reconstruct humans' relationship to other life forms and emphasizes the necessity of biodiversity conservation. Furthermore, Darwin's web of life can be considered as the first attempt of this kind to comprehend the holistic ecological system. Thus, Darwin's project demonstrates the important link between the theory of evolution and ecological science and consequently, with environmental ethics. Pioneer environmental ethicists like Aldo Leopold, Ian McHarg and Rachel Carson justified their arguments and claims on the basis of this conception of environment where interconnections among organisms were bestowed with the utmost priority. While Carson (1962) highlighted how human mastery was the cause behind the increasing rate of extinction of other life forms, which in turn, was severely hampering the web of life, McHarg (1969) explored an intrinsic value system in the direction of biological evolution. In the same vein, Leopold (1949) concept of the land pyramid encompasses all natural entities for moral consideration. Eventually, the concepts of web of life and the tree of life provide the necessary ground for extending the moral consideration. These ethical standpoints no doubt are based on an ecological understanding. Marietta (1979)

termed this kind of ethics as ecological ethics and defined it as follows:

The basic concept behind an ecological ethic is that morally acceptable treatment of the environment is that which does not upset the integrity of the ecosystem... The integrity of the ecosystem is held to be a dynamic homeostasis which can be comprehended through ecological science (ibid., 197).

This ecological understanding of nature, as being the life-supporting system, alters the human beings' relation with environment from 'human-and-nature' to 'human-in-nature'. In this manner, it offers a way to build ethical principles based on our interdependency on nature.

The most important concept that environmental ethics borrows from ecological science is of 'ecosystem'. Ecosystem is taken as the primary unit for moral consideration, and also seen as vested with intrinsic value in various schools of environmental ethics. Anthropocentric ethics guided by the idea of ecosystem promotes environmental management to maintain the balance of the ecosystem. Moreover, I observe, Leopold's Land ethic, Carson's descriptive narrative of environmental change, or Arne Ness's Deep ecology, all are normatively based on the conception of ecosystem puts forth by ecology. The debate in environmental ethics on holism vs. organism becomes even robust after considering the environment as an ecosystem. The notion of ecosystem opposes the laboratory based understanding of an organism and argues for studying organisms

in their very own niche. In this regard, it is important to note Nelson (2010) argument that there is a divergence in understanding holism in the discipline of environmental ethics and often holism is being naively conceptualized against reductionism. Ecology as a holistic science is influenced by the philosophy of holism, and in turn, provides a substantial justification to foster holism. The upshot of this influence gets reflected in the most celebrated concepts like biotic community or ecological self.

On one hand, the scientific conception of nature dominates the discipline of environmental ethics, particularly the school of anthropocentric ethics and the early developments in the ecocentric ethics. On the other hand, borrowing from Vogel (1998), it would not be wrong to argue that the most recommended school of environmental ethics, ecocentric school, is also heavily influenced by the teleological conceptualization of environment. The concepts of pristine nature and intrinsic value indicate that this school conceptualizes environment as having its own goals and purposes. This teleological conceptualization, I see, is an outcome of the historical understandings of nature. First of all, the presence of this teleological conceptualization can be found in the cosmological perspective of nature, as Aristotle describes it. Baidur (2015) highlighted the connection between Aristotle's concept of *entelechy*, denoting 'being-at-an-end', and the teleological conceptualization. This concept stands for an 'act for an end', and consequently,

Aristotle's conception of nature ascribes a purpose or a definite goal to nature. It conceptualizes nature as a self-moving being continuously moving towards the ultimate end to fulfil certain purposes. Secondly, Darwin's natural history again offers the scientific bedrock to this teleological conceptualization as the tree of life and the evolution of nature advocates for a progressive notion of nature. The tree of life explains all life forms are coming out of a common ancestor and thus the evolutionary process should be unhindered. The evolutionary account of nature "makes it something that could replicate and evolve" (ibid., 35) and can finally attain its ultimate end. Baindur (2015) rightly denoted this kind of understanding of nature as the conception of a 'progressive nature'.

Hence, it can be concluded that the very conceptualization of 'environment' in environmental ethics is a product of historical development of the idea of nature. This discussion indicates that the very positivistic framework of environment what Soper (1995) would say a realistic conception of nature, is pronouncedly present in the discourse. With the emergence of the scientific discourse, there was a sharp turn in the epistemological and ontological understanding of the environment. Environment turns into an object of study, either as the assemblage of organisms or as an ecosystem. Over time, conceptualizing environment as an ecosystem becomes prominent due to the influence of ecological science and evolutionary biology. Environmental ethics

considers environment as a life-supporting system and this understanding becomes the normative ground for the subsequent ethical interventions. This positivistic notion also emphasizes the problem/solution based attitude, and imposes normative values on the scientifically developed notion of the environment as an ecosystem. This discipline still follows the paradigm where the environment is conceptualized either as a form of autonomous system like an ecosystem or like a pristine-wild nature. In this regard, I would like to mention that Arias-Maldonado (2015) argued that in the Anthropocene, we had to shred the conception of nature as a form of pristine otherness to create the space for a postnatural notion of environment to emerge. He further argued that now by ecosystems we actually meant "homogenous and limited suite of cosmopolitan crops, livestock and creatures that got on well in environments dominated by humans" (ibid., 75). This modified notion of ecosystem is entirely based on a socio-cultural selection rather than an assemblage of natural ecosystems. Hence, it can be said that both the predominant concept of environment as a wilderness or as an ecosystem is on the verge of a cliff in the Anthropocene.

### **Social Construction of Nature in the Environmental Ethics**

Although the scientific paradigm is the dominating one in the discourse of environmental ethics, an alternative conception of environment does exist, simultaneously. This alternative conceptualization vouches for a new

understanding of the environment from the perspective of social construction of nature. Peterson (2006) stated that there were two kinds of understanding related to the social construction of nature. The first one holds that there is no scope of understanding nature without interpreting it. Historically, culturally, politically, or socially, nature is being interpreted in many diverse ways; and one cannot comprehend nature without being subscribed to any one of these perspectives. As Peterson highlights, “What is ‘constructed’ in this sense is not natural entities or objects, but rather their meanings in particular contexts” (ibid., 1568). The second view of the social construction of nature holds that not only the meaning of environment, rather, its physical aspects like national parks, city-parks, or rainforests are also culturally shaped by human beings and formulated as being a natural object. On the same line, Demeritt (2001) demarcated the strong literature on ‘denaturalizing’ something which usually got acknowledged as natural. Dermeritt (2001) argued that demarcating things as natural was a politically-driven act, and through ‘denaturalizing’, it was possible to critique some natural thing or phenomenon which was actually socially constructed and potentially a reformed category. This he termed as ‘social construction-as-refutation’. Through this, he even saw the idea like climate change or global warming was “socially constructed and historically contingent idea” (ibid., 35). The denaturalizing actually indicates a process to deconstruct ‘what is natural?’. The literature

on ‘denaturalization’ argues that natural is synonymous to essentially necessary, or biologically determined, or the external material world. The second conception of social construction of nature, as per Demeritt, emerges from the critique of the presumptions regarding knowledge and our existence, generated in the Enlightenment period. This second conception highlights the understanding of various interpretations through which the symbolic construction of nature takes place. It also demonstrates how the dominant one among various interpretations actually shapes the way we perceive the environment, and human beings’ relation to it.

Archer (2012) argued that the recent formulation of the concept of environment and the associated concepts that dominated environmental ethics, were the fruits of a positivistic epistemology. The scientific discourse that has emerged post World War II, brings forth concepts like ecosystem services, and invasive species, which actually promote a socially constructed idea of the environment. The notions of environment and environmental problems from this perspective reveal the futility of the attempts to strike an equilibrium or reaching a balanced state of the environment. This social construction of nature, in its most extreme form also refutes the idea of the environment, and argues that the notion of environment gets created by human society and culture. According to this perspective, without its presence in various discourses, there is no environment out there. However, there is a softer version of this conception,

which mostly highlights the impossibility of knowing the existing outside world and our epistemological limitation to acquire valid knowledge about it. Castree (2001) argued that nature never spoke for itself, rather the ultimate reality of nature was entirely contingent on the perspective of the experts. Precisely for this reason, instead of a singular version of what is nature, there should be multiple accounts of it. Castree's accounts of 'knowing nature', 'engaging nature', and 'remaking nature', elucidate the dominance of 'Western social formation' on the concept of nature. For example, 'knowing nature' as a social construction of nature argues that the concepts like sustainability, limits to growth, or even natural hazards are politically biased and highly value laden concepts. At times, these concepts become so pervasive that it simply gets next to impossible to go beyond these to be able to grasp the reality beneath. As Castree stated "Many nature discourses become so deeply entrenched in both lay and expert ways of thinking that they themselves appear natural" (ibid., 21).

To conclude, it can be said that this critical social constructivist conceptualization of the environment on one hand refutes deeply entrenched naturalistic paradigm in environmental ethics. On the other hand, it promotes an idea of the environment which is socio-politically constructed, as a product of human labor and social practices. By refuting the notion of environment as a pristine one and strongly negating environmental problems on the

ground of being socio-cultural or political ones, impede this conceptualization to acknowledge, as Vogel (2002) contended, the material hardness and the realness of the world. The social construction discourse being concentrated on the construction and the interpretation of the notion of nature, immensely gets influenced by the two very basic forms of dualism, what Latour calls 'paradox of modernity'. Bannon (2014) adopted a hermeneutic project and elaborately points out that the dualistic character of modernity and its influence on the conceptualization of environment. The first dualism, which predominantly influences the construction of the concept of nature and subsequently, I see, have bearings on this discourse as well, is of hyperseparation between nature and society or culture. The second one is between two practices through which this hyperseparation is at all possible—the acts of purification and translation. The process of purification always attempts to bracket one phenomenon either as natural or as social. We can observe, the social constructivist notion is influenced by this process as their sole aim is to establish environment as a socially constructed and politically moulded notion. The act of translation is just the opposite of the process of purification. Through this act, it is possible to create a hybrid network of relation that can actually bring the natural and the social/cultural together. The process of translation promotes that some phenomena cannot be comprehended if only seen through the perspective of one

of these two ontological categories—social and natural. In the era of the Anthropocene, when on one hand, human beings are inducing environmental phenomena and formulating knowledge about these, and on the other, the presence of real environmental issues is posing serious threats to the life-supporting systems and to numerous life forms, creating a hybrid network between the natural and the social/cultural is highly essential to understand any environmental phenomenon in its entirety.

At this juncture, I think for conceptualizing a hybridized notion of environment, first and foremost, it is required to unambiguously incorporate human beings in the very conceptualization of environment. One may contend that the environmental ethics literature considers human beings as a part of the environment. However, in the above discussion, we observe that the conceptualizations of environment as a pristine one, or as wilderness or having its own teleology, limit anthropogenic interferences. To overcome this ambiguity, I affirm, we need to acknowledge that environment is a relational word (Rolston III 1997, 44) and in the Anthropocene, human beings are at the very center of that relation. Hence, it is particularly important to explore how environmental ethics conceptualizes human beings and how far that conceptualization suffices to uphold a relational notion of environment.

### **Human Beings in Environmental Ethics**

In environmental ethics as the

conceptualization of human beings or how human beings function in the context of environment is not critically analyzed yet, I attempt to explore it through the analysis of two most prominent schools of environmental ethics: anthropocentric and ecocentric school. The anthropocentric school primarily emerges with the objective to sustain human needs from the environment. Moreover, the solutions this school recommends are entirely dependent on the scientific projections about changes in the environmental components and resources. Strong naturalistic conception of the environment leads this school to explore how different parts of environment function, and the causal interconnections among various components. With the help of this knowledge, it also attempts to understand the integrity of the components in the entire ecosystem. This knowledge guides this school to conclude that it is imperative to maintain the integrity and the balance of the system to retain the resource flows—highly necessary for sustaining life on Earth. On this line, the entire anthropocentric school can be considered to be based on the evaluation of anthropogenic impacts on various ecological processes and interconnections. Jaminson (2001) put forth that the global agenda of managing environment became stronger with the idea of sustainable development, what this school intended to attain. The emerging discourse of sustainable development moulds the environmental politics or the environmental management practices as well. The main initiatives in this regard, I posit, are

internationalizing environmental agendas and focusing on trade and technology transfer. At the same time, this discourse integrates economy and ecology, and link environmental problems with other social issues like global poverty and unjust resource distribution. Hence, it can be said that although the human need is at the very center of this school, there is hardly any attempt to comprehend how human beings function and relate to their environment. Instead, the environment becomes the principal object to know, evaluate, and to act upon to mitigate environmental problems, for this school. Thus, understanding the way environment functions gain more attention than why human beings are prone to act in environmentally destructive manners.

Moreover, for this school awareness building through information dissemination is considered as the most effective solution for addressing environmental issues. These solutions, I argue, are clearly based on the assumption that human beings by their very nature want to conserve and care for the environment and the main roadblock that is impeding this attitude to foster in reality, is the lack of adequate and appropriate information. Thus, this school of ethics constantly works on gathering more precise forms of information through valuation exercises, and then concentrates on dissemination to change human behavior. If this rather simplistic conception of human beings is precise, then one can expect to witness some evidences of that in the form of declining real world environmental issues. However, we can see at present

the world is witnessing a rapid upsurge in environmental problems, and ironically, anthropogenic changes are now equated to geological forces. Hence, it can be rightly argued, based on this observation that the underlying notion of human beings for anthropocentric school is rather simplistic, and naturally, the solutions proposed on the basis of that are destined to be inadequate and would never be capable of addressing the root cause of environmental problems. These guidelines can only work in the superficial realm to achieve some proximate outcomes like conserving one species, or choosing a renewable form of energy over a non-renewable one or inventing an ecologically appropriate technology, but these would largely fail to attain a sustainable form of human—environment relationship in the long run. In this regard, Jaminson (2001) highlighted if scientific and technological developments wanted to meet the ecological sustainability then it is necessary to adopt broader perspectives. To attain a broader perspective, I see human side of the story is the utmost important one to be incorporated.

The environment is in the locus for the school of ecocentric ethics as well. To extend the ethical consideration towards the environment, guided by ecological knowledge, this school decides the ‘good’ for the environment. However, unlike anthropocentric school, this does not limit itself only to acquiring scientific knowledge. Indeed, it focuses mostly on experiential knowledge that can substantiate scientific knowledge at the level of an individual. It

emphasizes the necessity for bringing an epistemological shift and believes that this shift can have a greater impact on human beings, rather than simply bombarding them with scientific facts and figures. For example, Land ethic vouches for the importance of experiencing the interconnectivity of the environment and highlights the need to create a biotic community on the basis of that. Or even, to attaining ecological self, Naess put forth the importance of experiencing our interconnections with other beings in the midst of nature. This focus on the epistemological shift, I contend, actually indicates the faith in the potential of experiential knowledge about the integrity of the environment, to induce a radical as well as a permanent shift in human consciousness and in the way we relate to the environment. Ecocentric school strongly upholds that a fundamental shift in human beings cannot happen by only imparting some objective knowledge and thus, it focuses on invoking modifications at the level of consciousness. For example, the Deep ecology's solution of fostering ecological self or ecofeminists approach for overcoming the logic of domination, function at the level of consciousness to address the current environmental crisis at its very roots. The assumption behind this epistemological shifts is that the first-hand experience can bring the necessary as well as a sufficient shift to transform an individual's behavior towards an environmentally benign form. As if, after the shift in one's consciousness, the individual would be able to think beyond own self-interest and would extend her

moral consideration to the environment. As indicated for anthropocentric school, this kind of faith on epistemological shift is the result of a rather simplistic understanding, which promotes that human beings always possess the intentions to change their behavior into environmentally benign forms and only unable to do so due the lack of experiential knowledge essential for the realization. Hence, it can be concluded that this entire process is also completely focused on the study of environment, with a simplistic understanding of human beings, to guide the human—environment relationship.

Finally, it can be summarized that both the schools believe in studying the environment to formulate effective ethical guidelines. Environmental ethics in the course of doing 'good' for the environment, on one hand, considers ecologically defined concepts of environment and on the other, acknowledges human limitation to grasp environment in its entirety. On the basis of these two perspectives, there is a constant urge to tease out 'what is good for the environment' by inquiring, knowing, observing, and evaluating its parameters and components. In the course comprehending how the environment functions and resolving associated debates around it, I posit, we have become completely oblivious of human beings. If the primary objective of environmental ethics is to guide the human—environment relationship, I strongly argue, then both these partakers should get equal priority in this discipline. Especially, human beings as the creator as

well as the implementer of environmental ethics, become an important subject to be conceptualized in the first place. Then only we can achieve an equal ground to establish an environmental ethic apposite for the Anthropocene.

### **Environmental Ethics and the Anthropocene**

The obvious question arises at this juncture is how far environmental ethics is ready to face the Anthropocene. The particular notion of environment which dominates the discourse of environmental ethics tends to follow the scientific paradigm and thus, inherently promotes the naturalistic fallacy. On the contrary, the alternative notion of environment could not really surpass the nature/culture dichotomy and also, fails to address the real world environmental issues. Along with, the locus of human beings in the discipline is found completely equivocal and often, its schools tend to uncritically ground their moral deliberations on rather simplistic conceptions of how human beings function in the context of the environment.

At the zenith of the Anthropocene era, the environment we encounter is no longer remain 'natural', and we as humans are no longer just cultural or social. Rather, as Latour (2014) highlighted that to understand the human—environment relationship in the present scenario, we needed a fundamental shift in how we differentiated between subjects and objects. Arias-Maldonado (2015) argued for the necessity to go beyond the usual conceptions of nature/environment to open up a space for a hybridized notion

of bewilderment between human and nature to foster. Here, I posit, in the era of the Anthropocene, environmental problems become twofold. At first, all environmental problems are seen as anthropogenic. This demarcation can easily induce us to follow the social constructivist idea that every environmental problem is in a way linked to a social problem. Secondly, the Anthropocene also breaches the boundary between human and nature. In this way, it urges us to think beyond this dualism of nature/culture, or in other words, it dismisses the possibility of 'purification' of the environmental problems. Instead, it highlights the need to realize that the problems are neither in human nor in nature, rather it lies in the relationship. To explore environmental problems in the milieu of the human—environment relationship, I accentuate, it is particularly important to understand the human side of this relationship as we are the owner of this relationship and also the moral agents of this ethics. Knowing how human beings function, perhaps could reveal more practical avenues to bring some profound and long-lasting shifts in the consciousness of the moral agents and would be the only feasible way of addressing this pressing environmental crisis in the era of the Anthropocene.

### **CONCLUSION**

Considering the contours of environmental ethics and the need of adopting a relational conceptualization of environment, I propose, it is imperative to develop a theoretical perspective and a corresponding

methodological tool. In this context, I would like to invoke Bannon's attempt to extend Latour (2004) idea of 'the collective world' to indicate a relational ontology where human and nonhuman worlds are existing in an assemblage. This relational ontology about nature inspires Bannon to rethink the monolithic concept of nature. He advocates the importance of phenomenology to make sense of the concept of nature in the midst of these dualisms. Instead of rejecting these dualisms, he claims that phenomenology as a method could help us to re-conceptualize environment, all together. On that same vein, I conclude phenomenology not only as a methodological tool, but also as a theoretical perspective could help environmental ethics to evolve and re-conceptualize the fundamental pillars of the human—environment relationship in the Anthropocene. Phenomenology presents a unique opportunity to explore the notion of environment through experiential accounts and could illuminate why it mostly becomes difficult for us to adopt environmentally benign behaviors. In this manner, phenomenology could be one of the apt ways to move towards building a different form of environmental ethic that could be equipped to handle the present days' mounting environmental crisis.

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<sup>1</sup>See Ramachandra Guha, *Environmentalism: A Global History* (New York: Longman, 2000).

<sup>2</sup>See Arias-Maldonado (2015). pp. 21–25.

<sup>3</sup>Biotic Community is Aldo Leopold's concept. It demarks a community which includes not only human beings but also non-human biotic and abiotic components and thus extends the horizon of the community.

<sup>4</sup>Ecological Self is Arne Ness's concept. Ecological self is a kind of self which is capable of explaining individual's self-relation with other non-human beings. This helps one to identify herself with other beings and thus, it widens the self and in the process, the self becomes mature.

<sup>5</sup>See Meera Baidur and Kalpita Bhar Paul (2015). Mapping the observer in the observation in Anthropocene: A Methodological Exploration. *Humanities Circle*, 3(2), 61–81 for more about the relevance of phenomenological methodology in the Anthropocene.

