THE CONCEPT OF JIHĀD IN QUṬB AND SHARI’ĀTI

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Khulasah

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Islam. Makalah ini juga turut mengupas konsep asas seperti konsep Islam dan Jāhiliyyah menurut Quṭb dan konsep tawhīd dan shirk menurut Shari’āti dalam usaha mengetengahkan faham jihad kedua tokoh.

Katakunci: Jihād, Mesir, Iran, Quṭb, Shari’āti, Sunni, Shi’ah, jāhiliyyah, Tawhīd, Qur’an

Abstract
This article will compare the concept of jihād of two contemporary Islamic radical figures, the Egyptian Sayyid Quṭb (d. 1966) and the Iranian ‘Ali Shari’āti (1977). It will place the concept within the context of the life and works of these two Islamic thinkers. Both Quṭb and Shari’āti shaped the view of Islam as an instrument of social change, and presented it as an alternative to Capitalism and Communism. They both shared the vision of Islam as a political movement, and while they opposed the secular nationalism that had dominated the 1960s, they also rejected the traditional Sunni or Shi’ite view that relegated political jihad to a secondary concern. They broke away from the established order that espoused the nationalist goals of the time, attracted a new generation of Muslim youth, and alienated the ulema. Quṭb and Shari’āti reactivated Islam as the political standard for Muslim behaviour. The essay will also contrast key concepts such as Islam and Jāhiliyyah in Quṭb and tawhīd and shirk in Shari’āti in order to demonstrate the dialectical character of their concept of jihād.

Keywords: Jihād, Egypt, Iran, Quṭb, Shari’āti, Sunni, Shi’ite, jāhiliyyah, Tawhīd, Qur’an
THE CONCEPT OF JIHĀD IN QUTB AND SHARI’ATI

Introduction

This essay will compare the concept of jihad of two contemporary Islamic radical figures, the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966) and the Iranian Ali Shari’ati (1977). Previously we have compared their views on jihad and fitrah, but here we focus on their concept of struggle, placing it in a biographical context. Globally, they shaped the Islamic identity of the Muslim youth, including South Africa where there was a need for an Islamic perspective to struggle against Apartheid. They both shaped the view of Islam as an instrument of social change, and presented it as an alternative to Capitalism and Communism. The immediate effects of Shari’ati and Qutb were felt in their own countries. Qutb’s activist role in Egypt is not less important than that of Hasan al-Banna’s, the founder of the Ikhwān al-Muslimīn (the Muslim Brotherhood), and Shari’ati’s role is not less important than that of Khomeini’s, the leader of the Islamic revolution in Iran.

Both Qutb and Shari’ati shared the vision of Islam as a political movement, and while they opposed the secular nationalism that had dominated the 1960s, they also rejected the traditional Sunni or Shi’ite view that relegated political jihad to a secondary concern. Both of them broke away from the established order, and attracted a new generation of Muslim youth, but alienated the middle class and the ulema. The 1960s was a period of nationalist ideology that gripped the Muslim countries, and was shaped by home-grown elites who had fought to break the stranglehold of European colonization and who led their countries to independence in the aftermath of the Second World War. The nationalist sentiments among Egyptians and Iranians had fragmented the historic land of Islam into nation states.


that pursued the agenda of Arab nationalism or Iranian nationalism. The nationalists took control of the modern media and put it in the service of their own secular ideals; consequently excluding the ulema who were accustomed to the traditional religious forms of expression. Quṭb and Shariʿati rejected the nationalist goals and reactivated Islam as the political standard for Muslim behaviour.

Sayyid Quṭb

Sayyid Quṭb was born in Upper Egypt in 1906, and later became a devout student of the literary giant Maḥmūd al-ʿAqqād, who influenced Quṭb profoundly, and encouraged him to immerse himself in Western literature. Quṭb was confused by this mass of secular literature, but later, when he undertook a serious study of the Qurʾan, albeit from a literary perspective, he rediscovered his true identity, and returned to his religious roots. This was a turning point in his life. He did, however, not regret his study of the Western human sciences, which enabled him to develop a critical appraisal of the intellectual jāhilīyyah (ignorance or babarism) of the time. His Taṣwīr al-fannī fī al-Qurʾān was originally undertaken with literary intent to examine the Qurʾan, but it had a profound impact on his understanding of the Qurʾan as a revealed book. In 1984 his al-ʿAdālah al-Ijtimāʿīyyah fī l Islām was published. This was his first major Islamic book, which he started writing before his study in America. No clear view of jāhilīyyah was expressed in this book, but in the same year, his criticism of jāhilīyyah emerged in his edited journal, al-fikr al-jādīd. Here began his first articulations of jāhilīyyah, which he elaborated on in his last, but most influential work, Maʿālim fi Tariq (Milestones). In Milestones he provided a clear method of removing jāhilīyyah in all its forms, starting with the political jāhilīyyah. When al-ʿAqqād saw Quṭb moving in the Islamic direction, he stopped his moral support, and Quṭb eventually parted
company with him. It is wrong to explain Quṭb’s jāhiliyyah purely in political terms. Indeed, he did condemn Western systems of governments, but before he directed his militant jihad to the regime change of jāhiliyyah systems, he already had a critical view of the Western literary jāhiliyyah, even before he went to America. However, he became more alive to the moral jāhiliyyah of Western society when he stayed in America. Thus, his negative attitude to jāhiliyyah in the West was not only political, but also moral and intellectual. He was disgusted not only by Western immorality while in America, but also by the empty theories and philosophies which he read before his visit to America. He was even more disgusted by the Arab Muslims in America who became so engulfed by American culture, and who compromised on their Islamic principles. He took a firm stand not to follow this path. Thus, his critical attitude towards Muslims at a social level was transferred to Muslims who made such compromises at a political level. Thus, Quṭb’s critique of Western immorality, secular modernity, and Muslim hypocrisy, have all combined to shape his anger at the West and the Muslim regimes that collaborated with them.

Jāhiliyyah was for him a comprehensive concept, social, political, moral and intellectual. The jihād against jāhiliyyah also takes on all of these forms, but towards the end of his life, when he wrote Milestones, he was convinced that the social, intellectual and moral expressions of jāhiliyyah could only be transformed by changing the political jahiliyyah of his time, and this meant regime change. By changing the superstructure of society; by changing the jāhiliyyah political systems, starting with Egypt, the whole society will change to an Islamic society. Like al-Bannā, Quṭb also held the view that man-made ideologies will corrupt the spiritual life of humanity. These jāhiliyyah ideologies, especially, Capitalism and Communism, had to be replaced by a political system.

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based on the rule of Sharī’ah.

Quṭb divided Egyptian society into two: the Capitalists who lived in luxury, and exploited the labour of the majority of the people, and the poor workers who have been exploited. Thus he called upon the liberation of the poor and the labourers from exploitation from colonialism and feudalism. Capitalism is tied up with European nationalism and exploitation and presents a challenge to Islam. Socialism is also not the alternative, although it provides minimum standards of living, employment, housing, social justice. Socialism conflicts with the concept of tawhīd. Marxism neglects human spiritual needs and explains history purely in material terms: “Marxism is completely ignorant of the human soul, its nature and history... It ascribes all incentives to the feeding of material human wants and to struggle for material gain. It describes all historical events as due solely to change in the means of production”\(^5\). Islam must inevitably clash with Marxism; Islam establishes belief in God, but Marxism denies God; Islam harmonizes between the the material and spiritual needs of man, but Marxism only concerns itself with man’s material needs\(^6\).

For Quṭb, the Islamic society asserts tawhīd, and opposes all false gods. It grants the individual free will and asserts only the sovereignty of God. The jāhiliyyah society is a society of shirk (polytheism) and rejects God as the sovereign, and submits to false gods, the worship of man, tyrants, ideologies. Communism, for example, denies God, surrenders to the will of the party, and cares only for man’s material needs. This is an example of a jāhiliyyah government that derives its laws from a human source, not from a revealed law or Shari’ah. Muslim countries that are ruled by man-made laws are also jāhiliyyah; they are the product of the soul of desires\(^7\).

There are two other points in his personal life that needs

\(^5\) Ibid., p. 249.
\(^6\) Ibid.
to be mentioned so that we can have a more comprehensive view of the factors that shaped his thought, especially his negative view of the West and of the contemporary Egyptian regime. The one point is the jubilant response of Americans when they heard of the death of Ḥasan al-Bannā. While he was in hospital in America, he could not understand the reason for the American jubilance, and then he discovered that they were happy because the main Muslim terrorist had died. Quṭb states: “Ḥasan al-Bannā was assssinated in 1949, my attention turned with severity to what American and European newspapers had observed and commented out of malicious joy and candid jubilance shown by them in dissolving the society, torturing its members and the killing of its General Guide”. Due to al-'Aqqād’s influence, Quṭb was not really interested in the Muslim Brotherhood, and he had not even met Hasan al-Bannā, but the American elation about al-Bannā’s death stirred his interest toward the Brotherhood and their objectives.

Another factor in his life that shaped his view of ḥiliyyah and jihād was his imprisonment and severe torture by the regime of Gamāl Abdal Nāṣir. The Ikhwān at first supported Naṣr when he assumed power in 1952, and saw in Naṣr’s Egypt an opportunity to build a society without divisions, gaurenteed by the implementation of an Islamic order. But Naṣr’s nationalist agenda conflicted with the Islamic agenda of the Ikhwān, and led to bloodshed. After the attempt on Naṣr’s life, which was blamed on the Ikhwān, the organization was dissolved, and their members were jailed, exiled or hanged. Those who were in exile spread the message of the Ikhwān to other countries; but followers of Quṭb have reassessed his thought, and adapted it for their own conditions, some have taken on a radical stance and others a more moderate position. After his severe torture in prison, Quṭb wrote Milestones, his

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most influential work where he explained the concept of jāḥiliyyah and jihād. This is the work that inspired modern Muslim militant movements such as Jamāʿat al-Takfīr wa al-Hijrah (pronouncing unbelief upon Infidels and Emigration to Islam) and the Egyptian al-Jihād. Some scholars regard Qutb as ‘The Philosopher of Islamic Terror’\(^{10}\). Bouramand makes the point that AbduSallām Farāj, theoretician of the Egyptian Islamic Jihād, was fond of quoting Qutb ‘to justify terror’\(^{11}\). Others, however, hold that his call for militant jihad was not directed at innocent civilians but corrupt Muslim governments \(^{12}\).

For Qutb, the post-independence history of the Muslim states had no inherent value, and called it jāḥiliyyah (ignorance or babarism), which traditionally refers to the pre-Islamic Arabs who worshipped stone idols, but for Qutb, it is also applicable to his contemporaries who worshipped the metaphorical idols of nationalism and socialism. Instead of the rule of God they have instituted the rule of man. Muslims ought to reject such unIslamic rulers\(^{13}\). Qutb insisted that a society that accepts such rulers and such customs is living in a state of uncouth ignorance or jāḥiliyyah. Bonner’s interpretation of Qutb is that the so-called Muslims who are living in ignorance are also infidels and should therefore be opposed, and jihād against them is obligatory on each Muslim (farq ‘ayn)\(^{14}\). This is an extreme view of Qutb. Our view is that Qutb’s jihād was directed at jihād against unjust rulers who were imposing unIslamic rule, and therefore he was calling for regime change and not violent methods of jihād against whole Muslim societies.


\(^{14}\) Ibid.
His *Fi Zilāl al-Qur‘ān* (In the Shade of the Qur‘ān) and his *Milestones*, written in the 1960s called for a new Qur‘ānic generation to replace the contemporary paganism of nationalism and socialism just as the Prophet and his companions had built a Quranic generation on the ruins of Arab paganism\(^\text{15}\). Before his release in prison, *Milestones* had been published in 1964. It consisted of some of the letters Quṭb had sent from prison and key sections from *In the Shade of the Qur‘ān*, and represented a concise, but powerful, summary of his ideas\(^\text{16}\).

The antithesis of *jāhiliyyah* was Islam, which he defined in accordance with two concepts he borrowed from Mawdūdī, ‘Ubūdiyyah (servitude to God alone) and Hākimiyyah (divine sovereign). Only God is sovereign, and only He is worthy of worship. The idea of divine rule is based on an interpretation of the Qur‘ān, traditionally translated as divine judgement, but for Quṭb it meant the government of God. Thus, *Jāhiliyyah*, refers to all those regimes that do not conform to divine law; in Quṭb’s time it refers to the Capitalist and Communist regimes. The jihād against such regimes will lead to their removal; hence removing the obstacles to a just and free society based on the principles of *tawḥīd*. Quṭb died before he could elaborate on these concepts, but there have been followers who have interpreted him in a more militant way to refer to whole societies living in a state of metaphorical paganism. If Quṭb’s jihād is directed at regime change and not whole societies, then the Western stigma attached to Quṭb as the father of modern Islamic terrorism is unfounded. He is however the father of present-day Islamic resistance throughout the Middle-East.

As mentioned, there were many factors, including Naṣr’s repression that provided the context for the crafting of Quṭb’s *jāhiliyyah*. This modern babarism must be removed as the Prophet removed the original *jāhiliyyah*, and must be

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replaced by the Islamic state. This is a radical departure from the traditional view, and even the view of the original members of the Ikhwān. What it meant is that Egyptian society as a whole is not Muslim, and that certain members who are impure are no longer Muslim by virtue of their impiety. This places them in the category of takfīr, which means that they have to be excommunicated from the society. This appears to be a neo-kharijite view, but the majority of ulema over the centuries were cautious not to apply this as it would imply dessension and discord within the community. Qutb died before he could explain what exactly he meant by jāhiliyyah.

Kepel identified three readings of jāhiliyyah that emerged among the followers: They pronounced takfīr on the whole society except for their members; they confined it to the rulers of the state who did not rule according to the divine text; lastly, the rupture with jāhiliyyah society meant a spiritual not material rupture. The third view was held by those Ikhwān who lived outside Egypt. They saw Ḥusayn al-Hudhaibī, successor to al-Banna, as their leader, and focussed on preaching, not condemning. The younger brothers tended to take a hard-line, but the maturer members were against the harsh radicalism and preferred political compromise.

By 1967, the Arab nation states were defeated by Israel, and Qutb’s ideas were given new life, and further inspired by the non-Arab ideologues such as Mawdūdī in India and Shariʿatī in Iran.

As noted above, crucial to the understanding of jihād is Qutb’s innovative concept of jāhiliyyah. In addition, his later view that jihad is not merely defensive, but also aggressive, is especially noteworthy for an understanding of his concept of jihād. This more aggressive view of jihad is not present in his Social Justice in Islam, but in his Milestones.

Qutb’s basic point of departure in Milestones is that all

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17 Kepel (2006), op cit., p. 31
systems, Capitalism or Communism have failed. He holds that Islam is in the hearts of believers and that it has been abandoned by the rulers and elites. We have recreated the pre-islamic jāhilīyyah; so we should fight this new ignorance which has poisoned the governments of Muslim countries. Islam and jāhilīyyah cannot coexist. For Islam to surpass jāhilīyyah we have to purify it of the jāhilīyyah customs and traditions that have crept into Islam, and that have made it impossible for people to see that Islam is the way to cure humanity of its ills. We have to return to the unique Qur’anic generation; the first generation that knew only the Qur’an. This new generation should be the concrete manifestation of Islamic belief (’aqīdah), embedded within the human soul, and it is this generation that is able to challenge the human elements of jāhilīyyah.

The traditional view of jihad such as the expansion of territory or defending its borders did not seem to concern him much; nor the view that the greater jihād (struggle against the lower self) is superior to the lesser, armed struggle jihād. For him, jihad is against all systems of anti-God or anti-shari’ah governments, whether they are in Muslim countries or non-Muslim countries. The armed-struggle jihād cannot be separated from the inner jihād; the inner jihād, although important for piety, cannot take the place of armed struggle jihād, which is integral to it.

Qutb was not an apologist for jihād, and as mentioned, proclaimed that Islam was not merely defensive, but also offensive. However, although offensive, it is not coercive in its goals; but a means by which God’s message can be heard and by which peace can be established. For this to happen, the superstructures that impede the freedom of this message, have to be removed. Jihād and proclamation

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are linked together:

Jihād is necessary for proclamation, since its goals are to announce the liberation of man in a manner that will confront the present reality with equivalent means in every aspect, and it does not suffice with hypothetical and theoretical proclamations, whether the Islamic lands are safe or threatened by neighbours\textsuperscript{23}.

Peace is defined as when the religion belongs to God alone, and no other Lords are competing with Allah. Jihād is not modern war, it is within the very temperament of Islam, which has given it a true role\textsuperscript{24}.

It is this \textit{jāhiliyyah} that impedes the Islamic movement from establishing the Law of God. It should therefore be removed, even by means of violent jihād. Quṭb states:

It is the right of Islam to move first, for Islam is not the belief of a single group, nor the system of the state, but a divine way and a global system. Thus it has the right to move [ahead] and to destroy impediments, whether systems or statues, that fetters human freedom of choice. It does not attack individuals, compelling them to embrace its creed, but attacks systems and statues to liberate individuals from the corrupt influences that corrode innate human nature and restricts human freedom of choice\textsuperscript{25}.

By its very nature, Islam is global and aggressive; either the world hears Islam, and has the freedom to accept or reject it, or it does not. Anti-God constitutions will not allow humanity that choice, only an Islamic state with divine law

\textsuperscript{23} Quṭb, Sayyid (1980), \textit{op.cit.}, p. 62-91.

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{25} Quṭb, Sayyid (1980), \textit{op.cit.}, p. 89.
will. A case is made for the aggressive nature of jihād, but it is directed at freedom of choice for humanity. After all, there is no compulsion in religion.

For Qūṭb there are only two systems, Nīzām al-Jāhilī (the system of ignorance) or Nīzām al-Īslām (the system of Islam). These two systems cannot coexist, and so where a system of ignorance exists, it should be removed, and we should fight against it as we are in the Home of hostility (Dārul Ḥarb).

This Islamic homeland is a refuge for anyone who accepts the Islamic Shari‘ah to be the Law of the State, as is the case with the dhimmis. Any place where the Islamic Shar‘iah is not enforced, and where Islam is not dominant, becomes the Home of Hostility (dār al-ḥarb) for Islam, the Muslim and the dhimmi. A Muslim will remain prepared to fight against it26.

Qūṭb states in uncompromising terms that Islam represents the command of God which cannot coexist with the system of jāhilīyyah, which represents the command of man. A Muslim’s duty is therefore to remove jāhilīyyah from the leadership of man. ‘The tree of Islam has been sown and nurtured by the wisdom of God, while the tree of jāhilīyyah is the product of the soul of human desires’27. The struggle against jāhilīyyah is imposed on Islam, and Islam has the right to remove all political obstacles that prevent it from addressing human reason and intuition.

Thus, Islam conforms to human nature; and it is able to challenge jāhilīyyah without undergoing transformation itself. Even Muslims who practice the way of jāhilīyyah cannot be regarded as true Muslims; and should be returned to Islam because they impede the Islamic movement from establishing the Law of God in the form of an Islamic State28.

There is a conflict between truth and falsehood, and

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27 Ibid., p. 241, 247.
Islam and jāhiliyyah, they cannot live together. The need to remove the system of jāhiliyyah and establish God’s rule makes jihad imperative. Good and evil are dialectical elements in society; through Islamic struggle, evil will be conquered, and good, which is harmonious with fiṭrah or innate human nature, will prevail.

In sum, Quṭb had an absolute view of the problems facing the Muslim world, arguing that these problems stemmed from the fact that Muslim societies were no longer ruled by Muslim norms and laws (the shari‘ah) and had become apostate by their imitation of foreign laws. Since (true) Muslims were visibly in the minority, they must concentrate upon (re)making society Muslim, and return to the Qur’anic generation. His Milestones was the basis for the charges against him; it was his final testament for which he was prepared to die. It captures his militancy towards Western systems of government, especially in Muslim countries. Peace and free choice are only possible with divine law. Every other law, every other system, is jāhiliyyah, and must be defeated. The word of God should prevail and be dominant. This was for Quṭb the very temperament of Islam, which became a mark of his own personality and temperament.

Ali Shari’ati

Ali Shari’ati was born in 1933 in North Eastern Iran, and was educated in Mashhad, He did his doctorate in Persian philology in Paris, and was influenced by the writings of Louis Masignon, Franz Fanon and Jean-Paul Satre. Shari’ati moved to Tehran in the late 60s and based himself at the Husainia Irshad, which was establised in 1965, and was dedicated to the principles of Imam Husayn.

The Marxist radical groups in Iran gripped the imagination of the students, many of whom had studied abroad, mostly in the United States. Student radicalism drew upon two sources: Marxism and socialist Shi’ism. The former did not filter through to the masses of Iran, because
their intellectuals were more steeped in the bookish culture of the proletariat rather than having any real contact with the grassroots Persian society. Aware of this shortcoming, a few Marxist intellectuals projected the messianiac expectations of the communists onto revolutionary Shi’ism. Shari’ati was a representative of this movement. Socialist Shi’ites saw the martyrdom of Imam Hussayn at the hands of the Ummayad Caliph as a source of inspiration for the oppressed masses of Iran. This movement found expression in the People’s Mujahidin. The secular middle class could not identify with the violent radicalism of this movement.

The students were generally distrustful of the ulema, and Khomeini who used the terminology of Mustad’afīn (disinherited) by Shari’ati, was able to win over the support of the Shi’ite socialist students. The political connotations of Shi’ism changed, and under the pretext of Imam Husayn’s martyrdom at Karbala, the struggle against the Shah became a modern incarnation. The dominant Shi’ite tradition was to forgo activism in favour of passivism, and the ashura ritual became characterised by grief and lamentation, not activism and resistance to injustice. For Shari’ati, the Shi’ite doctrine of Imamate became identified with the idea of leadership in the liberation struggle against imperial domination. In Alid Shi’ism he found the strong emphasis on justice as exemplified in the revolt of ‘Alī and his sons against the tyranny of the Ummayads. The true martyrs are the members of the family of the Imams, descendants of the Prophet’s cousin, ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, who died at the behest of oppressive and illegitimate rulers. In particular, ‘Alī’s son, Ḥusayn, killed in 680 at Karbala, is greatly revered as

29 This was the Sazman-i-Mujahidin-i-khalq-I Khalqi-Īran (Organization of the Jihad-fighters of the Iranian People), which was formed in the mid-1960s, and were inspired by Ahmad Reza’i, whose book, The Movement of Husain, held that ta’āhid does not only imply the worship of One God, but the elimination of class distinctions. Also, Imam Ḥusayn was a revolutionary who gave his life in order to form a classless society, free of Capitalism, despotism and imperialism. The organization was also inspired by Shari’ati’s ideas, but their main inspiration comes from Reza’i.

the martyr of martyrs$^{31}$.

For Shari’ati, this kind of struggle has been hidden by the Safavid Shi’ism who promoted the idea of the infallibility of the twelve Imams. People were conditioned not to expect it from the leaders in the absence of the Imams, and were therefore brainwashed to obey the oppressive governments and religious leaders who co-operated with them. His critique was that Safavid Shi’ism de-politicised Islam and made religion the opium of the people. In this respect he is in agreement with Khomeini, but he differs with him with regard to the role of the mujtahid. For Shari’ati, a sincere uneducated man may be more Islamic in his way of living than a learned jurist. Shari’ati saw the work of Husaini Irshad as an alternative to the Islamic seminaries, and he even blamed the conservative ulema for the success of imperialism$^{32}$.

Shari’ati blamed the ulema for perpetuating the submission to injustice with their focus on the twelfth Imam who will correct the injustices when he returns to this world. This created a psychological sense of acceptance of the corrupt status quo on the grounds that only the infallible Imams are capable of ruling justly, and that it is better to bear the current sufferings for a better life in the future. They had no desire for political power which they regarded as impure, and would rather wait for the return of the hidden imam who will replace the injustices of the world with light and justice. Shari’ati wanted to inspire people towards jihad and martyrdom by redirecting the theological focus towards the example of Husayn’s struggle and sacrifice.

Like Quṭb, who had a dialectic view of struggle between Islam and jāhiliyyah, Shari’ati also espoused a dialectic view of jīhād as a struggle of tawḥīd (monotheism) against shirk (polytheism). Shari’ati condemned Western society for their shirk, and also Iranian society for imitating them. The ideal Muslim society is a society of tawḥīd, a classless society

characterised by integration. Unlike Quṭb, Shari’atī did not call for a society ruled by Shari’ah, nor did he rely on traditional Islamic sources, but more on foreign ideological thought. Not withstanding his critique of Marxism for its materialistic world-view and for divesting man of free will, he betrays the influence of Marxist dialectical thought in his view of jihād. Shari’atī perceived human society divided into two types; the society of tawḥīd, which is characterised by a world-view of unity, and the society of shirk which is characterised by a world-view of disunity and contradiction. For him, human salvation is the summation of a dialectic-an inner ceaseless struggle which goes on at all levels of individual and social life until the final triumph of the principle of tawḥīd, which unites the conflicting separate parts of human existence, brings nature and society within an integrating sketch of the universe, and restores absolute equality as the primeval state of social life. History is a struggle between various opposites, truth and falsehood, monotheism and polytheism, oppressed and oppressor. He states: “History ... is dominated by a dialectical contradiction, a constant warfare between two hostile and contradictory elements that began with the creation of humanity”34. Also, the opposing poles of God and Satan exist in human nature and human fate; this creates within him a “dialectical, ineluctable, and evolutionary movement, and a constant struggle between two opposing poles in man’s essence and his life”35. He uses the Biblical story of Cain and Abel as a metaphorical framework to depict the two opposing forces engaged in struggle throughout history. The monotheistic world-view which was once the view of Adam, became transformed into a contradictory world vision, reflecting a dual class society; Cain representing evil (the oppressor) and Abel (the oppressed) representing good36. Cain is the

35 Ibid.
owner, landlord, usurper, and Abel is the dispossessed, the peasant, the exploited\textsuperscript{37}. Although we note the influence of historical determinism here; he did not follow it blindly and integrated his view of struggle into his world view of \textit{tawhīd}.

In 1973 the Husainia Irshad was forcibly closed by the government troops, and after a period of imprisonment, he was allowed to leave Iran, and go to London, where he died at the age of 44. His sudden and unexpected death was presumed to be the work of Savak, but another view is that he died of a heart attack. One wonders, if he had to be alive, what role he would have played in post-1979 Iran. He did not live to see the revolution but his influence on it was tremendous, perhaps equal to Khomeini’s. His impact on the youth was particularly great, and as an orator and man of charisma, he was able to restore confidence in the Western educated youth about Islamic struggle which is not obscurantist, but a genuine effort towards liberation and enlightenment.

The Muslim revivalists saw Islam as an alternative ideology to Capitalism and Socialism; so, they embraced the modern tools of technology and the media to serve the interest of the Islamic state; however, Shari’atī was more interested in the struggle for the removal of an unjust regime, and did not propose an Islamic state, but the utopia of a classless society based on \textit{tawhīd}. It is therefore not surprising that the Iranian ulema who were keen on an Islamic state were critical of him. The socialist inclined Mujahidin al Khalq found inspiration in Shari’atī, and Khomeini condemned the socialist movement, but not Shar’iati.

Shari’atī died two years before the Islamic revolution; but his impact on Iranians was felt both during his life, but also posthumously, moving them towards a heroic destruction of one of the most hideous tyrannies in modern times. His lectures at the Husainia Irshad moved people to activism and jihād against the tyranny of the oppressive

regime. He was fearless in his speech. We could gather this from anecdotal evidence from a friend who attended one of his lectures where he received a death-threat, which did not deter him; instead, it inspired him to give one of the most powerful speeches on martyrdom. His courage inspired millions of modern Iranians to regain confidence in Islam as a vibrant religion for our times.

Quṭb and Shari’āti saw Islam as an alternative ideology to Capitalism and Socialism; thus their response, like all Islamic revivalists, was a response to European modernity, and they found in Islam, an alternative modernity; an Islamic modernity that can challenge the current human modernities, by embracing the modern tools of technology and the media to serve the interest of the divine system. Shari’āti was more interested in the struggle for the removal of an unjust regime, but did not propose a new regime based on the shari’āh; but only provided a utopia of a classless society based on tawhīd. The details of who should assume political leadership, and how the society were to be governed was left to Khomeini to work out. Although the ulema of his time were critical of the Sorbonne graduate, and the socialist inclined Mujahidin al-Khalq who found inspiration in him, Khomeini condemned the socialist movement but not Shar’iati.

Ayyatollah Mutahari who collaborated with Shari’āti in their lectures at the Husainia Irshad in Tehran, broke away from him at one point on account of ideological differences. Mutahari’s critique of Marxism appears to be partly a critique of Shari’āti who sought to Islamize a foreign political philosophy. There is no mention of Shari’āti’s name with reference to his critique in his writings, but it can be assumed that the criticism was directed at Shari’āti. For example, Mutahari is critical of those Muslim scholars who justify historical materialism, and who associate the Qur’ānic word al-Naṣṣ with the proletariat as if the Qur’ān was adressing this class of society only38.

To conclude, we have examined the impact of Quṭb and Shariʿati on their respective countries, and placed their concept of jihād within their ideological frameworks of dialectical struggle. They were both a catalyst for change; Imam Khomeini mustered support among the religious masses, and Shariʿati gained the support of students and intellectuals. Both of them awakened the people to their oppressive conditions. Shariʿati died young, and did not live to see the fruit of his efforts. Khomeini lived long and became the leader of the Islamic revolution. They have demonstrated the role of jihād as an instrument of liberation and social change. Both espoused an innovative dialectic conception of jihād that is directed at unjust political authority, which they refer to jāhilīyah (Quṭb) or shirk (Shariʿati). They were critical of the traditional ulema who depoliticised Islam, and who collaborated with the despots of the day. They held the view that the new government should rule by the principle of tawḥīd (Shariʿati) or Sharīʿah (Quṭb), but it was not their view that it be ruled by the ulema or the mujtahids.